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Abstract
The presence of consumers able to respond to changes in wholesale electricity prices
facilitates the penetration of renewable intermittent sources of energy such as wind or sun
power. We investigate how adapting demand to intermittent electricity supply by making
consumers price-responsive - thanks to smart meters and home automation appliances -
impact the energy mix. We show that it always reduces carbon emissions. Furthermore,
when consumers are not too risk-averse, demand response is socially beneficial because the
loss from exposing consumers to volatile prices is more than offset by lower production
and environmental costs. However, the gain is decreasing when the proportion of reactive
consumers increases. Therefore, depending on the costs of the necessary smart hardware,
it may be non-optimal to equip the whole population.
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1 Introduction
Having consumers reactive to scarcity signals is an essential ingredient to reach efficiency in
the allocation of resources. In standard markets, scarcity is signaled by time-varying prices.
However, processing information and adapting consumption accordingly is not a simple prob-
lem for consumers, in particular when consumption decisions must be taken very frequently
and prices vary several times a day. This is the case for electricity. Consumers do not buy a
bulk of electricity at a given price, store it at home for several days or weeks, and take it out
of storage according to their versatile needs. For long, the solution has been to sign a contract
with a fixed price of electricity regardless of the timing of consumption. For a given total
quantity purchased, consumers who withdraw energy off-peak and those who do it at peak
periods are billed the same. Households are charged a fixed price by default in most countries1
They might sometime be able to opt to some sort of time-varying price, the most popular being
Time-of-Use (TOU),2 more rarely Critical Peak Pricing (CPP).3 Big industrial and commer-
cial consumers have also access to some form of real-time price adjustment through voluntary
load shedding, i.e. being rewarded from for reducing consumption below business-as-usual
during peak periods.4 However, most consumers stick to fixed price contract.5
The time-invariant pricing paradigm has recently been challenged by two novelties in
electricity provision. The first one has to do with digitization. The development of smart-
meters make real-time pricing technologically feasible in large scale. Furthermore, consumers
can now download free apps in their smartphones that help them reacting to price changes.
They receive day-ahead price signals. They can adjust their consumption in real-time with
a couple of clicks. They can also program their consumption in advance with automatic
switching devices or directly in their electric appliances (laundry, air-conditioners, heating
systems), depending on weather conditions and other demand shocks, and possibly on prices.
The second novelty that makes Real-Time Pricing (RTP) more adapted to nowadays elec-
1With the notable exception of Spain which charges wholesale electricity prices by default, see (Rolda´n-
Ferna´ndez et al. 2017).
2TOU prices vary according to a daily schedule, mostly peak versus off-peak hours.
3Under CPP, the electricity price is increased during declared peak-hours, with a requirement notice period
(e.g. previous day), potentially with limitation in duration per year.
4On load-shedding, see Crampes and Le´autier (2015) and Crampes and Waddams (2017). Some large
consumers have contracts that contains a clause of interruptible load program allowing the system operator to
automatically amend their level of consumption. Interruptible consumers are paid for this service. In January
2019, the French operator RTE used this possibility to contribute to the restoration of the frequency of the
European transmission system that was experiencing a potentially damageable drop (ENSTO-E, 2019).
5For instance, Schneider and Sunstein (2017) reports that 3.56 %, 6.76 % and 10.13 % of US residential,
commercial and industrial electricity consumers were exposed to some form of time-varying pricing in 2014.
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tricity provision is the penetration of intermittent renewable energies such as solar and wind
into the energy mix. Clearly, with these technologies the degree of energy scarcity is perma-
nently changing, partially in a predictable way, partially in an erratic way. Weather conditions
impact not only demand for electricity but also supply. Balancing the system becomes more
complex with a high share of wind and solar power. Having consumers reacting to wholesale
electricity prices would certainly help. In addition, the presence of reactive consumers would
improve both the economical and environmental value of intermittent renewables by reducing
the dependance to polluting conventional sources of energy such as natural gas and coal.
What are the private and social gains of making consumers reactive to electricity RTP?
The question has been analyzed by Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole
(2007) in a framework where demand is the source of uncertainty. Electricity is produced from
conventional energy sources (fossil and/or nuclear) and power plants can be called anytime.
Consumers benefit from RTP by avoiding curtailment and/or simply adapting their current
demand to price.
We investigate the same question with uncertainty on the supply side. Our analysis is
motivated by the transition to a decarbonated energy mix which replaces thermal power with
wind and solar power. Making consumers responsive to wholesale prices that intermittent
energy sources make random and/or cyclical is a crucial ingredient of this transition. A better
match between electricity consumption and production reduces the need to back-up windmills
and PV panels with thermal power facilities or storage capacity (as analyzed in Ambec and
Crampes 2012, 2019). It thus impacts the optimal investment in production capacities from
both sources of energy. Reversely, investment into wind and solar power production capacities
changes the benefit of making consumers reactive.
Unlike in Borenstein and Holland (2005) or Joskow and Tirole (2007) where random de-
mand is exogenous to the model, in our framework, wind and solar power production capacities
endogenize the variability embedded into the power system. We assume that all the source of
uncertainty is on the supply side. Its magnitude is increasing with the penetration of renew-
ables: the more windmills and PV panel are installed, the higher is the variation of supply with
weather conditions. Hence, the optimal investment in renewable is closely related to how con-
sumers can cope with uncertainty by reacting to real-time prices. Our framework relates two
sides of the energy transition: demand response (measured by the share of consumers reacting
to RTP) and decarbonation (measured by the social cost of carbon). It allows to investigate
a further research question: what is the role of demand response in the decarbonation of the
electricity mix?
Conceptually, we extend Ambec and Crampes (2019) by assuming that a share of con-
sumers are ’reactive’ in the sense that they adapt their electricity consumption to wholesale
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market prices.6 We characterize the optimal energy mix with a given share of reactive con-
sumers and its decentralization in competitive market with a pigouvian carbon tax. We find
that, compared to Ambec and Crampes (2019), the presence of reactive consumers modifies
the energy mix not only quantitively by also qualitatively. More precisely, in Ambec and
Crampes (2019), thermal power plants are running below their production capacity when the
wind is blowing and/or the sun is shining because they are used as back-up. In contrast, having
reactive consumers allows exploiting the full capacity of thermal power equipments regardless
of weather conditions. We also show that, for a given carbon tax, making more consumers
reactive to wholesale prices reduces carbon emissions.7 Hence, a policy that supports RTP
mitigates climate change, even if there is a “rebound effect”.
We endogenize the share of reactive consumers to find out the social benefit of RTP. We
identify three impacts of RTP. First, it exposes consumers to volatile consumption which
lowers their welfare. Second, it lowers economic and environmental costs by reducing both
thermal powered capacity and production. Third, it increases economic costs by requiring
more renewables. We show that, if consumers are not too risk-averse and/or price-inelastic,
the RTP is both socially and individually beneficial. Yet the marginal benefit from RTP
decreases with the share of reactive consumers. The latter result suggests that, since reacting
to RTP incurs technological and behavioral costs, not all consumers should be equipped with
smart-meters and automatic load-switching device.8
Our theoretical analysis complements many recent empirical studies on time-varying pric-
ing. Experimental evidence suggests that household do react to CPP provided that they get
real-time feedback on quantity of electricity consumed via an in-home display (Allcott, 2011,
Houde et al. 2013, Jessoe and Rapson, 2014). They reduce their consumption during the
window of critical peak price (a couple of hours), and increase their consumption just after
this period, compared to the household with a fixed-price contract (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014).
They might also reduce their consumption around the window of price increase (Andersen et
al. 2017). Households react even more to CPP by reducing further their consumption if they
are equipped with automation technologies (Bollinger and Hartmann, 2016, Gillan, 2017).9
They are more likely to respond if they are given the option to opt-in to time-varying pricing
6Helm and Mier (2019) investigate a similar model of electricity provision from intermittent sources with
consumers reacting to electricity prices in the wholesale market. They show that the first-best can be imple-
mented with a small share of non-reactive consumers. However, unlike us, they do not identify the private and
social value of making consumers reactive to wholesale prices.
7This result contrasts with Dato et al. 2020 who find that smart meters can increase carbon emissions.
8This result is in line with Le´autier (2014) who estimates that the average benefit from making consumers
price-responsive is well below the cost of installing the necessary smart-meters in France.
9For commercial and industrial consumers, Blonz (2020) finds a reduction of consumption by 13.5% during
critical peaks in California with CPP.
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rather than getting it by default (Fowlie et al. 2017).
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we determine the optimal energy mix when
a given proportion of consumers are price reactive. We also compute the wholesale and retail
prices allowing to decentralize the first-best allocation. In section 3, we analyze the effects of
a policy aimed at increasing the number of price-sensitive consumers. The global outcome is
positive in terms of net consumer surplus. We discompose it into a negative component due
to the exposure of consumers to risk and the increased cost in generators using renewables,
off-set by a gain due to the decrease in the production of plants burning fossil fuel. The
gain is also positive if the consumer’s welfare exhibits some risk-aversion. We conclude by
briefly discussing two issues related to time-varying pricing: its impact on inequality among
households and competition in the power sector.
2 Optimal energy mix with reactive consumers
We first introduce the analysis framework where electricity production can come from both
intermittent green sources and reliable but polluting plants, and some consumers buy energy
at spot prices while others sign a fixed-price contract with a retailer. In subsection 2.2 we
determine the optimal energy mix as a function of the environmental cost induced by burning
fossil fuel. We also compute the wholesale and retail prices that implement the first best.
In subsection 2.3 we compare the polluting emissions respectively due to the price-responsive
and non price-responsive consumers. Finally, subsection 2.4 examines how changes in the
proportion of price responsive consumers affects the energy mix and the resulting emissions.
2.1 The model
We consider a model of energy production and supply where electricity can be produced by
means of two technologies.10 One, the “fossil” source, is a fully controlled but polluting
technology (e.g. plants burning coal, oil or natural gas). It has the capacity to produce qf
kilowatt-hours at a unit operating cost c as long as production does not exceed the installed
capacity, Kf . The unit cost of capacity is rf . It emits air pollutants that cause damages to
society. We focus on greenhouse gases, mostly CO2, even though our analysis could encompass
other air pollutants such as SO2, NOx, or particulate matters. Let us denote by δ > 0 the
environmental marginal damage due to thermal power, that is, the social damage from CO2
emissions per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated.
The second technology relies on a clean but intermittent primary energy source, for example
10The model extends Ambec and Crampes (2019) with two types of consumers: reactive and non-reactive.
However, unlike in Ambec and Crampes (2019), we rule out the possibility of storage.
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wind. It makes it possible to produce qi kWh at zero cost as long as (i) qi is smaller than the
installed capacity Ki, and (ii) the primary energy is available, e.g. wind is blowing. There
are two states of nature: “with” and “without” intermittent energy. The state of nature with
(respectively without) intermittent energy occurs with frequency ν (respectively 1 − ν) and
state-dependent variables are identified by the superscript w (respectively w¯). The cost of
installing new capacity is ri per kilowatt. It varies depending on technology and location
(weather conditions, proximity to consumers, etc.) in the range [ri,+∞] according to the
density function f and the cumulative function F . The total potential capacity that can be
installed at cost ri is K¯ for every ri. We assume that investing in new intermittent capacity
has no effect on the probability of occurrence of state w. It only depends on the frequency of
windy days (or sunny hours for solar energy). Investing only increases the amount of energy
produced in state w.11 All along the paper, we assume that electricity cannot be stored,
transported or curtailed.12 The only way to balance supply and demand is then to rely on
production adjustment and/or demand adjustment through price variation.
We assume a continuum of consumers of mass one. Consumers derive a gross utility
S(q) from the consumption of q kilowatt-hours of electricity. Utility is a continuous derivable
function with S′ > 0 and S′′ < 0. The inverse demand for electricity is therefore P (q) = S′(q)
and the direct demand function is D(p) = S′−1(p) where p stands for the wholesale or the
retail price depending on whether the consumer is price responsive or not. The retail price
does not vary with the states of nature. By contrast, wholesale electricity prices are weather-
dependent: pw and pw¯ will denote the price of one kilowatt-hour of electricity in the wholesale
market in states w and w¯ respectively.
The retail and wholesale electricity prices are related by the zero profit condition for
electricity retailers implied by the assumption of free entry in the retail market. Since non-
reactive consumers want to buy the same quantity whatever the state of nature, as long as
they cannot be rationed and neglecting the operation costs of retailers, the retailer’s zero
profit condition boils down to p = νpw + (1 − ν)pw¯, i.e. the retail price of one kilowatt-hour
of electricity sold to non-reactive consumers is equal to its expected price in the wholesale
market. Carbon emissions are taxed at the Pigou rate equal to its social cost δ per kilowatt-
hour, and the revenue from this tax is used in a neutral way by the government. Lastly, we
11This assumption can be relaxed by allowing for more states of nature, that is by changing the occurrence
of intermittent energy from several sources. See Ambec and Crampes (2012), Section 4.
12By contrast, rationing is at the core of the papers of Joskow and Tirole (2007) and Le´autier (2014). However,
they both show that only non-reactive consumers should be rationed, which is still non feasible on technical
grounds for most consumers as they all are supplied through the same distribution lines. In the future it might
be possible to separate the two types thanks to smart appliances and meters. Our hypothesis of no-rationing
is consistent to electricity provision in developed countries.
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assume that
S′(0) > c+ rf + δ. (1)
In words, when electricity from fossil energy is the only production source, producing a positive
quantity is socially efficient.
The proportion of electricity consumers who react to price variations in the wholesale
market is denoted by β (1 ≥ β ≥ 0). Reactive consumers (subscript “r”) buy qwr kilowatt-hours
in state w and qw¯r in state w¯. We denote by qr¯ the electricity consumption of non-reactive
consumers (subscript r¯).
2.2 Optimal energy mix
First note that we can directly state that qw¯i = 0, q
w¯
f = Kf and q
w
i = Ki = K¯F (r˜i) where
r˜i ≥ ri. Indeed, without wind (in state w¯) there is no generation from wind turbines. As for
qw¯f = Kf and q
w
i = Ki, they are justified by the costs of capacity, rf and r˜i : it would be
inefficient not to produce at full capacity with technology f in state w¯ and with technology i
in state w respectively. Finally Ki = K¯F (r˜i) because turbines will be installed in the order
of increasing cost. Note that assuming the possibility of having qw¯f = Kf and q
w
f < Ki is a
strong implicit hypothesis on the flexibility of technology f .
The remaining variables Kf , r˜i, q
w
f , q
w
r , q
w¯
r and qr¯ are chosen to maximize the expected
social surplus:
EW = β[νS(qwr ) + (1− ν)S(qw¯r )] + (1− β)S(qr¯)
−ν(c+ δ)qwf − (1− ν)(c+ δ)Kf
−K¯
! r˜i
ri
ridF (ri)− rfKf . (2)
The two terms in the first line are the gross expected surplus of reactive and non-reactive
consumers respectively. The two terms in the second line are the operating costs of the fossil
fuel technology (including the environmental damage) in states of nature w and w¯ respectively.
There is no operating cost for the renewable source. Finally the third line represents the
capacity costs of the renewable and the fossil-fuel technologies respectively.
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The constraints of the problem are:13
Kf = βq
w¯
r + (1− β)qr¯ (3)
K¯F (r˜i) + q
w
f = βq
w
r + (1− β)qr¯ (4)
qwf ≥ 0 (5)
qwf ≤ Kf (6)
r˜i ≥ ri (7)
The first two constraints (3) and (4) are the market clearing conditions in states of nature
w¯ and w respectively. Each condition equalizes electricity supply from the two technologies
with demand from both types of consumers. The third constraint requires that electricity
production from fossil fuel in state w be non-negative, and the fourth constraint precludes it
from exceeding production capacity. The fifth constraint (7) states that the threshold capacity
cost r˜i of renewables is bounded downward by the lowest cost ri.
The solution to welfare maximization varies with the parameter values in a complex way
because the thresholds between the different types of dispatching depend on the number of
reactive consumers. Let δ1 (β) denote the solution to
β
"
D(c+ δ1)−D
#
c+ δ1 +
rf
1− ν
$%
= K¯F (ν(c+ δ1)), (8)
and δ2 (β) the solution to
βD(c+ δ2) + (1− β)D(c+ δ2 + rf ) = K¯F (ν(c+ δ2)). (9)
As shown by (28) in Appendix A, the first equation corresponds to the implicit function
qwf = Kf . It separates the solution where the fossil technology is used at full scale in state w
and the solution with production below capacity. The second equation is derived from qwf = 0.
It separates the solution where the fossil technology is used in state w and the solution where
all production in state w comes from the intermittent technology.
Solving the above program and characterizing the equilibrium prices in the wholesale and
retailing markets, we obtain the following proposition. The proof is in Appendix A.14
Proposition 1 The optimal levels of capacity, output and price are such that:
(a) for δ < δa
def
=
ri
ν − (c+ rf ): no investment in intermittent energy
13We omit sign constraints on the three consumption variables because we already know they are strictly
positive by (1).
14As shown in the Appendix, Proposition 1 is valid if ν is below a critical value !ν. Otherwise, case b.2 vanishes
for large values of β.
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Ki = 0, Kf = q
w
f = D(c+ δ + rf )
p = pw = pw¯ = c+ δ + rf
(b) for δa ≤ δ ≤ δ2 (β): both sources of energy are used in state w
(b1) for δa ≤ δ ≤ δ1 (β): thermal power is used at full capacity in state w
Ki = K¯F (νp
w), Kf = βD(p
w¯) + (1− β)D(p), qwf = Kf
pw = r˜iν , p
w¯ = c+ δ +
rf−r˜i
1−ν , p = c+ rf + δ
with r˜i given by K¯F (r˜i) = β
&
D
'
r˜i
ν
(−D )c+ δ + rf−r˜i1−ν *+
(b2) for δ1 (β) ≤ δ ≤ δ2 (β): thermal power is used below capacity in state w
Ki = K¯F (νp
w), Kf = βD(p
w¯) + (1− β)D(p), qwf = Kf −Ki > 0
pw = c+ δ = r˜iν , p
w¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1−ν , p = c+ rf + δ
(c) for δ2 (β) < δ: only intermittent energy is used in state w
Ki = K¯F (νp
w), Kf = βD(p
w¯) + (1− β)D(p), qwf = 0
pw = r˜iν , p
w¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1−ν , p = r˜i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf
with r˜i given by K¯F (r˜i) = βD
'
r˜i
ν
(
+ (1− β)D ((1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf + r˜i).
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The frontiers between the different zones are
discussed in subsection 2.4.
Proposition 1 generalizes the optimal energy mix described in Ambec and Crampes (2019)
to the case where a fraction of consumers are reactive to spot prices. Importantly, the presence
of reactive consumers introduces a discontinuity in the optimal energy mix. Indeed, the above
energy mix and prices determined for β > 0 have strong differences with the case where β = 0
analyzed in Proposition 1 of Ambec and Crampes (2019). When β = 0, the optimal energy
mix as a function of the environmental cost δ is represented along the x-axis in Figure 1. It
has only three zones15: (a), (b.2) and (c). In zone (a), no wind turbine should be installed.
All production comes from the plants burning fossil fuel at full capacity, whatever the state
of nature. In zone (b.2), wind turbines are installed. Thermal power plants are producing in
both states of nature, at full capacity in state w¯ and below capacity in state w to complement
wind power. In zone (c), wind turbines are the only electricity producers in state w, and
thermal power plants only produce in state w¯, both at full capacity.
The presence of reactive consumers modifies the optimal energy mix described in Ambec
and Crampes (2019) on three features. First, as long as β > 0, an additional zone labeled
(b1) shows up. In this zone, thermal power plant are producing at full capacity in both states
of nature w and w¯. Having the f capacity fully used while the i technology is operating
15The proof is in Ambec and Crampes (2019).
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Figure 1: Optimal energy mix with a share of reactive consumers
is not a solution for only non-reactive consumers because the constraint that maintains the
output equality between the two states of nature Ki + q
w
f = Kf makes it necessary to have
qwf < Kf whenever Ki > 0. In contrast, thanks to reactive consumers, thermal power plants
can now be run at full capacity on windy days because reactive consumers actively participate
in the balancing of the system. We can see it by combining (3) and (4). It gives Ki + q
w
f =
Kf + β(q
w
r − qw¯r ) which allows to have qwf = Kf even if Ki > 0.
Second, introducing some reactive consumers lowers the threshold social value of carbon
above which wind power becomes socially beneficial. The threshold is now
ri
ν −(c+rf ) whereas
with only non-reactive consumers (β = 0), it is
ri
ν − c. The reason is, without consumer’s
adaptation, thermal power plants are used below full capacity in state w when wind turbines
are active (case b of Proposition 1 in Ambec and Crampes 2019). Therefore the opportunity
benefit to take into consideration is only the operating cost of fossil plants c+δ. Now, with the
presence of reactive consumers that results in the emergence of case (b1 ), the thermal power
plants are fully used in state w. The threshold becomes
ri
ν − (c + rf ) because the trade-off
is between more capacity of the intermittent source and more capacity of the fossil source.
Therefore, the opportunity benefit is the full cost of the fossil technology c + δ + rf . As a
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consequence, there is a discontinuity in the threshold when jumping from β = 0 to β > 0.16
Third, reactive consumers affect investment in both sources of energy Kf and Ki. It
modifies the threshold social value of carbon δ2 (β) beyond which wind power capacity is
sufficient to supply demand on windy days (case (c) ).
2.3 Consumption and carbon emissions
We now compare the consumption and the carbon emission of reactive and non-reactive con-
sumers. Since reactive consumers respond to state-dependent prices pw and pw¯ instead of
retail price p, their consumption is state-dependent. They consume less than non-reactive
consumers when the price is higher (in state w¯) and more when the price in lower (in state
w). They switch between consumption sources across states of nature or dates: consumption
from a representative17 reactive consumers is D(pw) and D(pw¯) in states w and w¯ respectively,
while a representative non-reactive consumers consumes D(p) is both states of nature. From
this perspective, reactive consumers are substitutes to storage as they are able to ‘transfer’
electricity from one state of nature to another by shifting their consumption. Such up and
down adaptation to price variations by reactive consumers has been documented empirically
by Jessoe and Rapson (2014).
How a reactive consumer’s total consumption νD(pw) + (1 − ν)D(pw¯) compares to that
of a non-reactive consumer D(pr¯) depends on the curvature of the demand-function D(p).
Since p = νpw + (1 − ν)pw¯, D(p) linear implies D(p) = νD(pw) + (1 − ν)D(pw¯): both types
consume the same amount of electricity across states of nature. If D(p) is strictly convex (i.e.
D′′(p) > 0), by the Jensen inequality, D(p) = D(νpw + (1− ν)pw¯) < νD(pw) + (1− ν)D(pw¯):
reactive consumers consume more than non-reactive consumers. Reversely, if D(p) is strictly
concave (i.e. D′′(p) < 0), D(p) = D(νpw+(1−ν)(pw¯) > νD(pw)+(1−ν)D(pw¯) so that reactive
consumers consume less that non-reactive consumers. Hence, the difference in terms of overall
electricity consumption depends on the variation of price-elasticity along the demand curve.
Being reactive induces more consumption through a ‘rebound effect’ when D(p) is convex,
that is when demand becomes less elastic with higher price. In the opposite case, adjusting
consumption to wholesale prices reduces total electricity consumption.
When it comes to environmental externalities, the pollution induced by the electricity
consumed by reactive consumers is generally lower. It is so even when they consume more than
non-reactive consumers. It is only in cases (b1) and (b2) in Proposition 1 that more electricity
16This discontinuity confirms that the introduction of reactive consumers is not equivalent to just increasing
ν in the case of non-reactive consumers only, as if it was possible to use wind power more often.
17Recall that we assume a continuum of consumers of mass 1 so that a ’representative’ consumer is of mass
1. A representative reactive consumer is a reactive consumers of mass 1 instead of mass β. The same applies
for non-reactive consumers who are in mass 1− β. Hereafter, we drop the mention ’representative’.
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bought by reactive consumers might translate into more emissions. However it is unlikely as
they consume more when the energy mix is cleaner in state w and less when it is dirtier in
state w¯. To get more emissions, it should be such that the extra kilowatt-hours consumed in
state w pollute more than the one saved in state w¯, formally if αν(qwr − qr¯) > (1− ν)(qr¯ − qw¯r )
where α ≡ q
w
f
Ki + q
w
f
is the carbon content per kilowatt-hour relative to fossil fuel. Yet, even if
it is case, we will show in the next subsection that making consumers reactive always reduces
pollution.
2.4 Energy mix adjustment to more demand-response
We examine how the optimal energy mix varies with the proportion of reactive consumers.
We derive three corollaries to Proposition 1 that highlight the role of reactive consumers in
the energy market penetration by intermittent renewables.
Corollary 1 When energy supply is intermittent, increasing the share of reactive consumers
always reduces pollution.
To investigate how increasing demand response impact greenhouse gas emissions when
Ki > 0, we differentiate total emissions νq
w
f + (1− ν)Kf with respect to β. Since qwf = Kf in
case (b1) and qwf = Kf −Ki = Kf − K¯F (ν(c+ δ)) in case (b2), in both cases, we obtain:
d[νqwf + (1− ν)Kf ]
dβ
=
dKf
dβ
= D(pw¯)−D(p) < 0,
where the last equality is due to the market-clearing condition (3) while the last inequality is
implied by pw¯ > p. In case (c), since qwf = 0, the market clearing condition (3) leads to:
d[νqwf + (1− ν)Kf ]
dβ
=
(1− ν)dKf
dβ
= (1− ν) ,D(pw¯)−D(p)- < 0.
Corollary 2 Increasing the share of price reactive customers has no impact on the retail
price, except in zone (c) where it increases.
Indeed in zones (a), (b1) and (b2) we have p = c+ rf + δ, because the fossil-fuel technology
produces in both states of nature, then the price equals its long run marginal social cost which
is does not vary with thermal power capacity and production. Consequently, even if changing
β does modify installed thermal power capacity Kf , it has no effect on its long run marginal
social cost and thus on the retail price. However it is not the case in zone (c) because the
retail price p = r˜i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf depends on the renewable energy long term marginal
cost which varies with production capacity Ki. A larger β requires more capacity Ki which,
12
because the cost of renewable increases ri with capacity. With an increasing cost of renewables
capacity ri, it pushes the wholesale price p
w = r˜iν in state w up, hence a larger retail price.
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Corollary 3 Non coordinated public policy decisions can result in energy mix switches with
disturbing effects on prices and emissions.
This is the consequence of having frontiers δ1 (β) and δ2 (β) increasing in β in Figure 1.
Suppose for example that we are in zone (b1) with the use of thermal power plants at full
capacity even when the wind energy converters are spinning. A drastic increase of the carbon
tax δ might drive the energy mix into zone (b2) where thermal power plants are now used
below capacity on windy days. If, later, price responsiveness is strongly encouraged with a big
push on β, we can be driven back into the energy mix of type (b1), where thermal power plants
are running again at full capacity on windy days. This requires capacity adaptations that can
be avoided by inverting the order of decisions (first increase β, then δ), or by increasing both
simultaneously.
3 Social benefit of reactive consumers
To evaluate the social benefit of making more consumers reactive, we differentiate the expected
social welfare defined in (2) with respect to the percentage of reactive consumers β and we
discuss the resulting components in two lemma followed by two propositions.
Lemma 1 The marginal expected social surplus due to an increase in β is given by:
[νS(qwr ) + (1− ν)S(qw¯r )− S(qr¯)] + [(1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ](qr¯ − qw¯r )− r˜i(qwr − qr¯). (10)
The proof of Lemma 1, in Appendix B.1, uses the market-clearing conditions (3) and (4)
and the envelope theorem.
Lemma 1 decomposes the impact of the marginal increase of the share of reactive consumer
into three terms. The first term between square brackets is the variation in expected surplus
or utility from making consumers reactive. It is negative by the following Lemma proved in
Appendix B.2.
Lemma 2 The expected gross surplus of being a reactive consumer is smaller than the gross
surplus of being non-reactive: S(qr¯) > νS(q
w
r ) + (1− ν)S(qw¯r ) where qr¯ = D(p), qwr = D(pw),
and qw¯r = D(p
w¯) with p = νpw + (1− ν)pw¯.
18The later results differ from Le´autier (2014) who finds that retail price does not vary with the share of
reactive consumers.
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Switching from a constant price to state-contingent prices reduces gross surplus as it obliges
consumers to modify their consumption of electricity across time, depending on the states of
nature. They prefer a constant consumption because, with a concave S, they are averse to
state-dependent consumption.19 The more risk averse in terms of quantities, the greater this
utility loss.20
The second term in (10) is the cost saved on thermal powered electricity by the consumption
pattern of reactive consumers. Consumption in state w¯ is reduced by qr¯−qw¯r > 0, which allows
for (1−ν)(c+δ)+rf in expected savings per kilowatt-hour by reducing thermal power capacity
and polluting emissions.
The third term in (10) is the extra cost of wind power due to reactive consumers’ higher
demand in state w. Consumption in state w is increased by qwr − qr¯, of which the marginal
cost is r˜i.
With negative and positive terms, the sign of (10) seems ambiguous. To be able to sign
(10), note that by replacing marginal costs by prices from Proposition 1, we can express (10)
as a variation of consumers’ net expected welfare:
ν (S(qwr )− pwqwr ) + (1− ν)
'
S(qw¯r )− pw¯qw¯r
(− (S(qr¯)− pqr¯) . (11)
The marginal benefit of demand response in (11) is simply the expected net surplus of being
reactive for the consumers. It implies that social and individual interests are aligned when it
comes to demand response: it is optimal to increase the share of reactive consumers as long
as those consumers benefit from being reactive.
To sign (11) we show in Appendix B.3 that the net social surplus S(D(p)) − pD(p) is a
convex function of the power price p. This means that the expected net social surplus is higher
with state-contingent prices pw and pw¯ than with the average of those prices p. Hence, (11)
is strictly positive. We summarize our findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the energy mix contains intermittent sources, the impact of an increase
in demand response on welfare is threefold: (i) a loss from exposing risk-averse consumers to
volatile consumptions, (ii) lower costs and emissions from reducing thermal powered electricity,
and (iii) increased costs from the installation of more renewables. The net impact is positive.
The result that consumers benefit from being reactive relies on the assumption of per-
fect competition and our measure of consumer’s welfare. It is known since Waugh (1944)
19Notice that S(qwr )+(1−ν)S(qw¯r )−S(qr¯) < 0 cannot be directly inferred from the concavity of S (.) because
qr¯ ∕= νqwr + (1− ν)qw¯r , except if the demand function is linear.
20In line with this result, Qiu et al. (2017) find that risk-averse consumers are less likely to enroll for
time-of-use electricity pricing programs in the U.S.
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that consumers’ surplus is higher with variable prices than with their constant average price.
Turnovsky et al (1980) have shown that it is due to the convexity of the indirect utility func-
tion with respect to price. We reproduce this result in our model. It implies that real-time
pricing is beneficial on the ground of expected consumer’s net surplus. We clearly identify
the basic components of this net gain: reactive consumers are better-off because, even though
they are worse off in terms of gross surplus, they disburse much less than consumers paying
a fixed price. In the next proposition, we show that this gain decreases with the share of
reactive consumers.
Proposition 3 The expected marginal social welfare is decreasing with the proportion of re-
active consumers β.
The proof is in Appendix C. This result is important because we have ignored so far the
cost of installing smart meters and load-shedding appliances at consumers’ locations. Such
costs should be compared with the aforementioned benefit of increasing demand response.
With a decreasing expected marginal social welfare, if the marginal cost of increasing β is
increasing or constant (for example the unit cost of a smart meter), we most likely will find
an interior solution: not all consumers should be equipped with smart meters.21 It is so even
with homogenous consumers because the higher proportion of reactive consumers reduces the
need for price reactivity. It thus weakens the advantages of investing in smart appliances to
make more consumers dependent on states of nature.
We close the section by investigating the robustness of Proposition 2 to more general
measures of the consumer’s welfare. By using the net consumer surplus S(D(p))− pD(p), we
implicitly assumed that consumers are neutral regarding variations of monetary gains. Risk
aversion can be embedded easily into the consumer’s welfare by considering a concave utility
function applied to the net monetary consumer’s surplus. Formally, we define the consumer’s
indirect utility with respect to price p as V (p)
def
= U(S(D(p)) − pD(p)) with U ′(C) > 0 and
U ′′(C) ≤ 0 for any C > 0. Let us denote the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion
as a function of price by ρ(p)
def
=
−U ′′(S(D(p))− pD(p))
U ′(S(D(p))− pD(p)) and the price-elasticity of demand
by &(p)
def
= − p
D(p)
D′(p). In Appendix D we establish the following last proposition.
Proposition 4 Demand response benefits to consumers if
&(p)
pD(p)
> ρ(p) for every p ∈
[pw, pw¯].
21Le´autier (2014) finds a similar result of partial equipment with smart-meters using simulations calibrated
on France.
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Proposition 4 generalizes the last sentence of Proposition 2 to risk-adverse consumers.22 It
also revisits a result established by Shalit et al (1980) in our setting. It relates the convexity
of the indirect utility function V (p) with respect to price with risk aversion, price-elasticity
and total spending on electricity. In a nutshell, the consumers are likely to benefit from being
reactive to real-time if their aversion to monetary risks is low, they adapt their electricity
consumption to price variations (high price-elasticity &(p)) and/or their electricity bill pD(p)
is high. In the case of a reverse inequality in Proposition 4, the indirect utility V (p) is concave
so that consumers prefer a constant electricity price equals to the mean of variable prices.23
4 Conclusion
Smart meters with load-switch devices and batteries help consumers to adapt electricity con-
sumption to price changes. Although making consumers reactive reduces production and
environmental costs − including the back-up equipment cost and pollution induced by ther-
mal power − it exposes consumers to price fluctuations that force them to adjust their con-
sumption over states of nature. Such risk exposure effects should be incorporated into the
cost-benefit analysis of installing smart meters and charging real-time electricity prices. Our
paper identifies the main ingredients of this cost-benefit analysis. It also relates the economic
and environmental value of intermittent renewables to demand response. A higher share of
reactive consumers does not only reduce pollution and thermal power production capacity,
it also allows to better exploit this capacity across time. Consumers benefit from real-time
electricity pricing provided that they are not too risk-adverse and their demand is sufficiently
elastic. However, the gain decreases with the proportion of price-reactive consumers. Hence,
real-time pricing is socially efficient up to a point where the smart meters and appliances costs
offset the gains.
We conclude with two remarks. The first one is about the distributional consequences of
having a share of the population reactive to real-time prices. Empirical evidences show that
individuals that are more likely to optimize their energy use are more educated (Mills and
Schleich 2010, Brounen et al. 2013) and consume more energy (Blasch et al. 2019). Hence,
the people who are the more likely to remain with a fixed price contract are the less educated
and poorest. Not only they do not benefit from smart meters but they can also be hurt by
an increase of the share reactive consumers. Indeed, as explained in the paragraph following
22Note that our result is supported by the empirical evidence found by Qiu et al. (2017) that risk-averse
consumers are less likely to enroll for time-of-use electricity pricing programs in the U.S.
23Note that the condition in Proposition 4 implicitly includes parameters related to the economic and envi-
ronmental costs of electricity provision through price p. In particular, the higher is the social cost of carbon
(and carbon tax) δ, the higher are the price range [pw, pw¯] and spending pD(p).
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Corollary 2, an increase of β has the adverse effect of increasing the retail price due to the
investment into more less profitable windmills for a given Pigouvian tax δ. Some form of
redistribution is thus required to compensate the adverse effect of real-time pricing on non-
reactive consumers, especially if they are more vulnerable to high energy costs. Otherwise,
this effect will add up to the hostility to energy transition.
The second remark has to do with market power. Along the paper we have assumed
perfect competition in both electricity wholesale and retailing market. Like in Joskow and
Tirole (2007), we might investigate how our results extend to imperfect competition. Clearly,
the exercise of market power by either producers or retailers should increase the benefit of
switching to real-time pricing. It is obviously so if imperfect competition is at the retail stage
as reactive consumers can bypass retailing prices by being charged wholesale prices. The same
is true in case of barriers to entry at the production stage for thermal or nuclear electricity.
Moving to real-time pricing can be a strategy to partly escape the exercise of market power
by dominant thermal and nuclear producers. Electricity consumption is adjusted over time to
take advantage of a more competitive sector thanks to small wind and solar producers. Yet
household with fixed price contracts are captive as the retail price is often fully determined
by thermal power production costs (see cases (b1) and (b2) in Proposition 1). Hence, with
market power in the electricity sector, favoring real-time pricing by installing smart-meters
and home automation devices is not only a policy to support the energy transition. It also
fosters competition to the benefit of consumers.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 Welfare maximisation
Denoting γw¯,γw, µf , µf and µi the multipliers associated with the constraints (3), (4), (5), (6)
and (7) respectively, the Lagrange function corresponding to the program can be written as
L = β[νS(qwr ) + (1− ν)S(qw¯r )] + (1− β)S(qr¯)− ν(c+ δ)qwf − (1− ν)(c+ δ)Kf
+νγw[K¯F (r˜i) + q
w
f − βqwr − (1− β)qr¯] + (1− ν)γw¯[Kf − βqw¯r − (1− β)qr¯]
+ν
&
µ
f
qwf + µ¯f (Kf − qwf ) + µi (r˜i − ri)
+
− K¯
! r˜i
ri
ridF (ri)− rfKf
Given the linearity of technologies and the concavity of the surplus function, the solution
is determined by the following first-order conditions:
qwr : S
′(qwr ) = γw (12)
qwr : S
′(qw¯r ) = γw¯ (13)
qr¯ : S
′(qr¯) = νγw + (1− ν)γw¯ (14)
qwf : −(c+ δ) + γw − µ¯f + µf = 0 (15)
Kf : −(1− ν)(c+ δ)− rf + (1− ν)γw¯ + νµ¯f = 0 (16)
r˜i : −r˜i + νγw + νµ′i = 0 (17)
where µ
′
i
≡ µ
i
/K¯f (.ri), plus the complementary slackness conditions derived from the inequal-
ity constraints of the program. Combining the first-order conditions, we obtain:
S′(qwr ) = c+ δ + µ¯f − µf (18)
S′(qw¯r ) = c+ δ +
rf − νµ¯f
1− ν (19)
S′(qr¯) = νS′(qwr ) + (1− ν)S′(qw¯r ) (20)
S′(qwr ) =
r˜i
ν
− µ′
i
(21)
From (18) and (21), we obtain.ri
ν
= c+ δ + µ¯f − µf + µ′i. (22)
• case (a). Without intermittent energy, we have r˜i = ri and µ′i ≥ 0.Moreover, since K¯F (.ri) =
0, the quantity- balancing constraints (3) and (4) imply
Kf − qwf = β(qw¯r − qwr ). (23)
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We show by contradiction that qwf = Kf . Suppose q
w
f < Kf . It entails that µ¯f = 0 by
the corresponding complementary slackness condition, and qwr < q
w¯
r by (23). Consequently
S′(qwr ) > S′(qw¯r ) since S”(.) < 0 which, combined with (18) and (19), leads to
rf
1−v < −µf , a
contradiction since µ
f
≥ 0. Hence, qwf = Kf and qwr = qw¯r . This implies µf = 0 and µ¯f = rf
by (18) and (19). Then qr¯ = q
w
r = q
w¯
r = S
′−1(c + δ + rf ). By (21) µ′i =
ri
ν − S′(qwr ) ≥ 0 =⇒
ri
ν ≥ c+ δ + rf , or
δ ≤ δa def= ri
ν
− (c+ rf ) (24)
To decentralize this allocation, wholesale prices must be low enough to discourage re-
newables, high enough to balance the budget of thermal producers and such that consumers
demand the first best quantity, then pw = pw¯ = p = c+ δ + rf .
• For δ > δa, there is investment in intermittent energy (cases (b) and (c)): r˜i > ri and
µ′
i
= 0. In case (b), discomposed into (b1) and (b2), we have qwf > 0, then µf = 0.
• case (b1). Assume first that µ¯f > 0, and then qwf = Kf . By equation (22), µ¯f = r˜iν − (c+ δ)
which, combined with (18) and (19) leads to qwr = S
′−1 ' r˜i
ν
(
and qw¯r = S
′−1
)
c+δ+rf−r˜i
1−ν
*
. The
cost of the marginal wind turbine r˜i is defined by combining the production-consumption
constraints (3) and (4) with qwf = Kf . It is the solution r˜i of the following equation:
K¯F (r˜i) = β
"
S′−1
#
r˜i
ν
$
− S′−1
#
c+ δ + rf − r˜i
1− ν
$%
(25)
Competitive state-dependent prices are therefore pw = r˜iν and p
w¯ =
c+δ+rf−r˜i
1−ν . Combined
with (20), it leads to qr¯ = D(c+ δ + rf ) and p = νp
w + (1− ν)pw¯ = c+ δ + rf .
Equation (25) can be interpreted as an equilibrium between supply (left-hand side) and
demand (right-hand side) for renewables. Supply is increasing in ri and nil if ri ≤ ri. Demand
is decreasing ri and nil if ν(c+ δ+ rf ) ≤ ri. Then equilibrium exists only if ri ≤ ν(c+ δ+ rf ).
It results that the switch from case (a) to case (b1) is when K¯F (ri) ≥ 0 =⇒ riν ≤
c+δ+rf−ri
1−ν
(if β > 0), that is δ ≥ riν − (c+ rf ).
• case (b2). Suppose now that µf = 0 which holds for qwf < Kf . Conditions (18) and (19)
become S′(qwr ) = c + δ and S′(qw¯r ) = c + δ +
rf
1−ν respectively, which yields state-dependent
consumption levels for reactive consumers: qwr = D(c+δ), q
w¯
r = D(c+δ+
rf
1−ν ) and, combined
with (20), non-state dependent consumption for the others: qr¯ = D(c + δ + rf ). They are
consistent with state-dependent market prices pw = c+δ and pw¯ = c+δ+
rf
1−ν and retail price
p = c+ δ+ rf . These prices satisfy the zero-profit condition for thermal power producers and
electricity retailers. Condition (22) yields the cost of the marginal wind turbines r˜i = ν(c+ δ)
and, therefore, the installed wind power capacity is Ki = K¯F (ν(c + δ)). Thermal power
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capacity is determined by the market-clearing condition in state w¯ (3), that is:
Kf = βq
w¯
r + (1− β)qr¯ = βD
#
c+ δ +
rf
1− ν
$
+ (1− β)D (c+ δ + rf ) . (26)
The market clearing condition in state w (4) yields:
qwf = βD(c+ δ) + (1− β)D(c+ δ + rf )− K¯F (ν(c+ δ)) (27)
The switch from case (b1) to case (b2) arises when qwf ≤ Kf , then by (26) and (27), when
βD(c+ δ)− K¯F (ν(c+ δ)) ≤ βD
)
c+ δ +
rf
1− ν
*
. Let δ1 (β) denote the solution to:
β
"
D(c+ δ1)−D
#
c+ δ1 +
rf
1− ν
$%
= K¯F (ν(c+ δ1)) (28)
Then case (b2) begins when δ ≥ δ1 (β). Since qwf > 0, the right-hand side of (27) must be
positive. Since it is decreasing in δ, qwf > 0 holds for δ < δ2 (β) where δ2 (β) is the root of
qwf = 0 in (27). Then case (b2) ends when δ ≥ δ2 (β).
• case (c). Consider now the case qwf = 0 with all energy coming from the intermittent source in
state w. Then µ
f
≥ 0, µ¯f = 0 and µ′i = 0 which, in (19) and (21), leads to S′(qw¯r ) = c+δ+ rf1−ν
and S′(qwr ) =
r˜i
ν . Inserting the last two equalities into (20) yields qr¯ = D(r˜i+(1−ν)(c+δ)+rf ).
In (19) and (21), those equalities give qw¯r = D
)
c+ δ +
rf
1−ν
*
and qwr = D
'
r˜i
ν
(
. The market-
clearing condition in state w¯ (3) givesKf = βD
)
c+ δ +
rf
1−ν
*
+(1−β)D(r˜i+(1−ν)(c+δ)+rf ),
whereas the one in state w (4) defines r˜i uniquely as
K¯F (r˜i) = βD
#
r˜i
ν
$
+ (1− β)D (r˜i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ) . (29)
Lastly, the prices pw¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1−ν , p
w = r˜iν and p = r˜i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf decentralize this
solution under free entry.
A.2 Zoning
First, using equation (8), let us define
β1 (δ) =
K¯F (ν(c+ δ))
D(c+ δ)−D
)
c+ δ +
rf
1−ν
* (30)
The derivative with respect to δ is
∂β1 (δ)
∂δ
=
K¯νf(ν(c+ δ))− β1 (δ)
&
D
′
(c+ δ)−D′
)
c+ δ +
rf
1−ν
*+
D(c+ δ)−D
)
c+ δ +
rf
1−ν
* (31)
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The denominator is positive. A weakly convex demand function is sufficient for the nu-
merator also to be positive. Then under this convexity condition, β1 (δ) is increasing in δ.
Note that when β1 (δ) = 0, K¯F (ν(c+ δ)) = 0 so that ν(c+ δ) = ri. The later equality implies
that the threshold δ which divides cases (b1) and (b2) on the X-axis in Figure 1 is equals to
ri
ν − c.
Second, using (9), let us define
β2 (δ, ν) =
K¯F (ν(c+ δ))−D(c+ δ + rf )
D(c+ δ)−D(c+ δ + rf ) (32)
representing the frontier between the sets of parameters where qwf ≥ 0, the function qwf being
defined in (27). The derivative with respect to δ is
∂β2 (δ, ν)
∂δ
=
K¯νf(ν(c+ δ))− β2 (δ)D′(c+ δ)− (1− β2 (δ))D′(c+ δ + rf )
D(c+ δ)−D(c+ δ + rf ) > 0 (33)
Then β2 (δ, ν) is increasing in δ. Note that when β2 (δ, ν) = 0, K¯F (ν(c+δ))−D(c+δ+rf ) = 0
which corresponds to the threshold δ0 in Figure 1.
Let us de note δ1(β) and δ2(β) the inverse functions of β1(δ) and β2(δ) respectively. How
do δ1(β) and δ2(β) compare? On the X-axis in Figure 1 when β = 0, we know that δ1(0) =
ri
ν − c < δ0 = δ2(0) where the inequality comes from K¯F (ν(c+ δ1(0))) = 0 < K¯F (ν(c+ δ0)) =
D(c + δ0 + rf ) > 0 by definition of δ1(0) and δ0. We know from our above analysis of β1(δ)
and β2(δ) that, as β increases, both δ1(β) and δ2(β) increase but δ2(β) increases more than
δ1(β). They might therefore cross at some point βˆ such that δ1(βˆ) = δ2(βˆ), which case zone
(b2) vanishes for β ≥ βˆ. In Figure 1 we assume that it is not the case: δ1(βˆ) and δ2(βˆ) never
cross for every β ∈ (0, 1).
B Proof of Proposition 2
B.1 Marginal social benefit from increasing β
Let EW denote the expected social surplus defined in (2). It is the difference between the
expected gross surplus ES = β[νS(qwr ) + (1− ν)S(qw¯r )] + (1− β)S(qr¯) and the expected cost
EC = ν(c+ δ)qwf + [(1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ]Kf + r˜iK¯F (r˜i)− K¯
! r˜i
ri
F (ri)dri.
after integrating by parts K¯
/ r˜i
ri
ridF (ri) = r˜iK¯F (r˜i) − K¯
/ r˜i
ri
F (ri)dri. Using the market-
clearing conditions (3) and (4), we write the expected cost as a function of β and the control
variables:
EC = ν(c+δ)qwf +[(1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ] (βqw¯r +(1−β)qr¯)+ r˜i[βqwr +(1−β)qr¯−qwf ]−K¯F (r˜i).
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The expected social surplus is a function EW (x,β) where x stands for the vector of control
variables qwr , q
w¯
r , qr¯, q
w
f ,Kf , r˜i. Differentiating wrt β, we obtain:
dEW (x,β)
dβ
=
∂EW (x,β)
∂x
dx
dβ
+
∂EW (x,β)
∂β
=
∂EW (x,β)
∂β
by the envelop theorem. Consequently, in all cases, we have
dEW (x,β)
dβ
=
∂ [ES(x,β)− EC(x,β)]
∂β
= [νS(qwr ) + (1− ν)S(qw¯r )− S(qr¯)] + [(1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ](qr¯ − qw¯r )− r˜i(qwr − qr¯).
B.2 Consumer’s expected gross surplus
Let g(p) ≡ S(D(p)) be the social surplus as a function of power price. We have g′(p) =
S′(D(p))D′(p) < 0 and g′′(p) = S′′(D(p))[D′(p)]2 + S′(D(p))D′′(p). For g(p) to be concave
(g′′(p) ≤ 0), we need
D′′(p) ≤ −S
′′(D(p))[D′(p)]2
S′(D(p))
. (34)
Since S′(.) > 0 S′′(.) < 0, the right-hand side is positive. Condition (34) holds if D′′(p) is
negative or nil, that is if D(p) is concave or linear. It also holds if D′′(p) is positive and low,
that is if D(p) is not too convex.24
With g(p) concave, by Jensen inequality, g(E[pr] > E[g(pr)] where pr is the price charged to
reactive consumers, which is pw with probability ν and 1−pw¯ with probability 1−ν. Therefore
g(pr) is equal to g(p
w) with probability ν and g(pw¯) with probability 1 − ν. Since E[pr] =
νpw+(1−ν)pw¯ = p by Proposition 1, the last inequality becomes g(p) > νg(pw)+(1−ν)g(pw¯)
which, given the definition of g(p), qr¯ = D(p), q
w
r = D(p
w), and qw¯r = D(p
w¯), leads to
S(qr¯) > νS(q
w
r ) + (1− ν)S(qw¯r ).
B.3 Consumer’s expected net surplus
Let h(p) ≡ S(D(p)) − pD(p) be the consumer’s surplus net of expenditures as a function of
prices. We have h′(p) = [S′(D(p))−p]D′(p)−D(p) = −D(p) < 0 where the last equality is due
24Intuitively, a very convex demand means a strong variation of price-elasticity along the curve. At the limit,
demand is inelastic for high prices pw¯ and very elastic for low prices pw. Reactive consumers would benefit a
great deal from a reduced price of electricity from thermal powered plants pw¯ (since their consumption would
remain almost unchanged) without being hurt too much by a higher price of wind power with the installation
of more wind turbines.
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to the fact that demand D(p) at any arbitrary price p is such that S′(D(p)) = p. Therefore
h′′(p) = −D′(p) > 0. Hence h(p) is decreasing and convex. By Jensen inequality, since h(p)
is convex, p = νpw + (1− ν)pw¯ implies h(p) < νh(pw) + (1− ν)h(pw¯). Given the definition of
h(p), qr¯ = D(p), q
w
r = D(p
w), and qw¯r = D(p
w¯), the last inequality leads to:
S(qr¯)− pqr¯ < ν[S(qwr )− pwqwr ] + (1− ν)[S(qw¯r )− pw¯qw¯r ].
C Proof of Proposition 3
Consider now the second derivative of the expected welfare EW (x,β) with respect to β.
Applying the envelope theorem again, it is just
d2EW (x,β)
dβ2
= −νqwr
dpw
dβ
− (1− ν)qw¯r
dpw
dβ
+ qr¯
dp
dβ
= −ν (qwr − qr¯)
dpw
dβ
+ (1− ν) 'qr¯ − qw¯r ( dpwdβ (35)
In all cases we know that qwr > qr¯ > q
w¯
r .
• In case (b1 ), by differentiation of (25) ,we obtain,
dr˜i
dβ
=
qwr − qw¯r
Kf (r˜i)− β
&
1
νD
′ ' r˜i
ν
(
+ 11−νD
′
)
c+δ+rf−r˜i
1−ν
*+ > 0 (36)
Knowing the prices, we can compute
dpw
dβ
= 1ν
dr˜i
dβ
,
dpw¯
dβ
= − 11− ν
dr˜i
dβ
that we insert
into (35) to obtain
d2EW (x,β)
dβ2
= − 'qwr − qw¯r ( dr˜idβ < 0
• In case (b2 ), since both pw = c + δ and pw¯ = c + δ + rf1− ν are independent of β, we
obtain
d2EW (x,β)
dβ2
= 0.
• In case (c), by differentiation of (29) ,we obtain,
dr˜i
dβ
=
qwr − qw¯r
K¯f (r˜i)− βνD′( r˜iν )− (1− β)D′ (r˜i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf )
> 0. (37)
With prices pw = r˜iν , p
w¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1− ν , we find
d2EW (x,β)
dβ2
= − (qwr − qr¯)
dr˜i
dβ
< 0
Note that qwr − qw¯r > qwr − qr¯ : the marginal expected surplus decreases more rapidly in
case (b1 ) than in case (c).
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D Proof of Proposition 4
First, notice that with V (p) as a measure of welfare, the first-theorem of welfare applies so
that efficient energy mix is unchanged given β. Consumers equalize their marginal utility
of electricity consumption to price, i.e. S′(q) = p. Perfect competition implies that prices
reflect marginal social costs. Hence the energy mix defined in Proposition 1 still holds. In
particular, the retailing constant price p still equals the average of the wholesale prices, i.e.
p = νpw + (1− ν)pw¯.
Second, the first derivative of the indirect utility function V (p)
def
= U(S(D(p))−pD(p)) is:
V ′(p) = U ′(.)
0
[S′(D(p))− p]D′(p)−D(p)1 = −U ′(.)D(p) < 0
where the last equality is due to the fact that demand D(p) at any arbitrary price p is such
that S′(D(p)) = p. Therefore V (p) is decreasing with p.
The second derivative of V (p) is:
V ′′(p) = U ′′(.)(D(p))2 − U ′(.)D′(p). (38)
The function V (p) is convex if V ′′(p) > 0, which, using (38), leads to:
−D
′(p)
D(p)
>
−U ′′(.)
U ′(.)
D(p).
By multiplying both sides of the above inequality by p and using the definition of ρ(p) and
&(p) we obtain the inequality in Proposition 4.
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